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Abstract
Electronic monitoring (EM) serves as an alternative sanction to incarceration. An im-
portant aspect that remains only scarcely debated in the literature is EM’s punitiveness
and, more specifically, exactly how punitive EM is in comparison to different forms of
incarceration. Responding to this gap, we propose a systematic meta-analysis of relevant
studies that scrutinizes and compares different studies on EM and its punitive effects (or
perceptions of its degree of punitiveness) in relation to incarceration. Ultimately, there is no
simple and straightforward answer: EM’s level of punitiveness differs with the various
sociodemographic variables of respondents included in the studies and the various
characteristics of the penal system. It is necessary to assess the degree of punitiveness of EM
to determine the conditions under and terms with which it should be applied, for example,
as a humane substitute for incarceration or as an additional pain of the penal system.
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Debates about alternative and new forms of sanctioning and surveillance are often related
to questions of cost, punitiveness, level of security and preventive and rehabilitative
effects. Such questions of implementation and effect emerge in opposition to ethical
questions regarding the rights of offenders. Assessing the quality of alternative forms of
sanctioning and surveillance is a demanding task, especially for the governments re-
sponsible for the sanction.
These debates apply in particular to electronic monitoring (EM), a technology-based
form of detention. Since EM was introduced in 1984 in the United States and in the late
1980s in Europe (first in the United Kingdom and Sweden, followed by Denmark in
2005, Finland in 2006 and Norway in 2008) (Killias et al., 2010), researchers have been
interested in EM’s level of punitiveness compared to other forms of detention. Situating
ourselves within this discussion, we conducted a meta-analysis of research in different
countries to determine the degree of punitiveness of EM. This article makes an im-
portant contribution to understanding EM by revealing the degree of punitiveness of
EM.
An important distinction has to be made regarding whether EM is used instead of
incarceration or as an added restriction, such as a condition for parole (Kilgore, 2012,
2015), because it has an important effect on the question of its punitiveness. We will come
back to this later. Although EM is used to implement different court orders (e.g. re-
straining orders and curfew), its level of punitiveness has thus far mostly been inves-
tigated in the context of house arrest. Accordingly, in this article, ‘EM’ always refers to
electronically monitored house arrest.
In the following, we first focus on the relation between EM and punitiveness. Then, we
describe our data collection methods, the resulting data corpus and our strategy of
analysis. Based on these data, we assess the punitiveness of EM in general and then
categorize its pains by translating the pains of imprisonment (Sykes, 1958) to pains of
EM. To present a deeper understanding of the issue, we explore the role demographic
variables play in EM experiences. We review offender perspectives and subsequently
discuss the points of view of related individuals and of the general community. To
conclude, we present our findings, outline the study’s limitations and make suggestions
for future research.
Punitiveness of electronic monitoring
In criminological theory, the punitive aspect of penalty is a central aim of the cor-
rectional system. Referring to Cohen (1994), Matthews (2013: 352) defines puni-
tiveness as a stance that ‘involves the infliction of pain, harm and suffering on
individuals in a coercive but impersonal manner by specialist, often legally empowered,
agencies’. Punitiveness is therefore inflicted on individuals subject to the correctional
system by legal enforcement authorities with the intention of causing some form of pain
or deprivation. It therefore involves a sanction that constitutes an excess above the
social norm of freedom of movement and agency, which is experienced by offenders and
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assessed by society. Unsurprisingly, the articles included in our meta-analysis focus on
both the experience and the assessment of the punitiveness of EM.
To analyse the punitiveness of EM, we based our conceptual approach to punitiveness
on the pains of imprisonment (Sykes, 1958; see also Payne and Gainey, 1998; Payne et al.,
2014). According to Sykes, incarceration results in five pains: deprivation of autonomy,
deprivation of goods and services, deprivation of liberty, deprivation of heterosexual
relationships and deprivation of security. In contrast to other researchers, we chose to also
deduce pains from the data and allow for new pains specific to EM. Therefore, some of the
pains discussed later correspond to pains of imprisonment (deprivation of autonomy and
deprivation of liberty) and point towards equal degrees of punitiveness of EM compared
to incarceration, and other forms of pain are similar to those by Sykes (pains affecting
relationships instead of deprivation of heterosexual relationship). Others are again specific
to EM because they relate to wearing an EM device or its costs (deprivation of
employment-favourable conditions, physical and financial pains).
More specifically, EM is a measure that uses an electronic device to monitor the
movement and localization of an offender. It is generally implemented by fitting a device
with a bracelet on the ankle or wrist. While older generations of EM connect to phone
lines in buildings, newer ones are equipped with GPS or GSM1 technology that provides
continuous information about wearer’s localization. EM is used to check offenders’
compliance with orders such as curfew and house arrest. Ultimately, it allows authorities
to control the movement and localization of offenders and offers an alternative to forms of
custody characterized by the total separation of the offender from their social context,
including living and working environments (Whitfield, 2013: 157).
In general, EM is used for very diverse purposes and is often coupled with other
measures and rehabilitative programmes. It can be used to monitor offenders’ attendance
of rehabilitative or therapeutic programmes as well as to control limits imposed on time
and space in sanctions such as house arrest. In general, EM is used for bail enforcement
(United States), front door schemes in which enforcement authorities directly apply EM as
an alternative to short-term custody and back door schemes in which offenders are subject
to EM after an early release from custody or also as an additional element of parole. Along
these lines, we distinguish EM as a substitute for incarceration from an element added to
pre-existing treatments or types of sanctions. This is not only a distinction in the way EM
is implemented, but also has important effects on its perceived punitiveness.
Apart from various studies that analyse a specific programme or experimental setting
for testing EM, some articles address the topic at a broader level. Schmidt’s (1998)
analysis of the usage of EM in the United States is an early example that presents the type
of equipment used and the different types of programmes evaluated. This important early
study focuses on initial experiences with EM in the United States. More recent literature
reviews EM’s use in other national contexts such as Denmark (Payne et al., 2014) and
Australia (Kornhauser and Laster, 2014). In addition to those articles that are more
oriented towards the enforcement authorities, Bülow’s (2014) analysis of EM highlights
six ethical standards and assesses the ethical implications of EM, including questions
about the privacy rights of offenders and the public (e.g. with reference to data storage).
Other issues concern the stigmatizing effect of EM. These aspects are directly linked to
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questions of punitiveness, as discussed by Eisenberg (2017). She argues that EM becomes
an additional punishment – including net-widening effects (e.g. Kilgore, 2015: 9) – when
added to other forms of treatment, which leads to the question of whether EM can be part
of a humane approach in the criminal justice system (Kilgore, 2015).
Research question
Eisenberg (2017), Payne and Gainey (1999) and Kilgore (2012, 2013, 2015) point to the
importance of assessing the punitiveness of EM. In particular, their contributions clearly
show that it is necessary to discuss the punitiveness of EM in-depth and to look closely at
various factors from the level of jurisdiction and type of sanction as well as socio-
demographic aspects. While Eisenberg (2017) opens up an important discussion, she
reviews existing literature rather than carrying out a meta-analysis based on existing
studies, and Payne and Gainey (1999) conduct a single study with a sample of 29 of-
fenders monitored by EM. We continue this discussion with a meta-analysis based on a
corpus of studies from different countries published over almost 20 years. We address the
following questions: Is EM house arrest experienced as punitive? Are there specific pains
of EM? How is the experience connected to offenders’ sociodemographic characteristics?
How is EM perceived by non-wearers? How is EM perceived by the community at large?
We conclude by linking these questions back to the characteristics of the criminal justice
system.
Data and method
To answer these questions, we use a meta-analysis based on a corpus of systematically
collected peer-reviewed articles. To ensure that articles varied across journals, disciplines
and, as much as possible, jurisdictions, we searched various databases, including Pro-
Quest, Social Sciences Citation Index, Sage Journals, Wiley Online Library and Google
Scholar. To narrow EM to the correctional context, the keyword ‘electronic monitoring’
was combined with the keywords ‘crime’, ‘prison’, ‘correction’, ‘penitentiary’, ‘de-
tention’, ‘carceral’ and ‘recidivism’. The search was restricted to articles published
between 1970 and 2020 and was further reduced to approximately 230 articles with
subjects related to the penal system.
The articles primarily focus on subjects such as recidivism (Anderson and Telle, 2019;
Gable, 2007; Marklund and Holmberg, 2009) and compliance (Hucklesby, 2009); po-
litical trends and uses (in single countries or jurisdictions) (Beyens, 2017; Boone et al.,
2017; Campello, 2017; Haverkamp and Woessner, 2016; Kensey et al., 2010; Laurie and
Maglione, 2020; Nellis, 2005); costs and benefits of EM (Belur et al., 2020; Omori and
Turner, 2015; Sukhodolov et al., 2017; Yang, 2017); the problem of net-widening
(Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, 2015); social, economic, psychological and educational
effects on offenders (Andersen and Andersen, 2014; Deuchar, 2012; Fallesen and
Andersen, 2017; Schwedler and Woessner, 2017) and non-offenders’ attitudes to-
wards EM (Furnham et al., 2010; Hucklesby, 2011; Shahbazov, 2019). Meanwhile, some
articles focus on technological development (Spalevic et al., 2016), privatizing trends in
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justice sanctions (Nellis, 2014; Paterson, 2007), issues of space and time relating to EM
(Devresse, 2012a) and the ways EM affects an offender’s environment (Devresse, 2012b).
Some of these articles concentrate on offenders with specific offences such as sexual
offences, domestic violence (Erez and Ibarra, 2007), driving under the influence or, more
generally, serious crimes and misdemeanours.
Based on the systematic analysis of article abstracts, the corpus was further reduced to 29
articles focusing explicitly on EM’s punitiveness (Table 1). These articles were imported
into qualitative data analysis software (MaxQDA) for coding. The codes helped to appraise
the types, methods, content and results of the articles and included the following topics:
setting of the study, demography of the group of focus, perspective of the group of focus
(e.g. offenders, staff and communities), research topic (experience with EM, opinion to-
wards EM, etc.), type of EM (e.g. front door, back door, type of programme) and puni-
tiveness (e.g. appraisal of the degree of punitiveness). The pains of imprisonment or EM
found in the articles were then extracted and summarized under the following headings: (1)
deprivation of autonomy, (2) deprivation of employment-favourable conditions, (3) pains
affecting relationships, (4) deprivation of liberty, (5) financial pains and (6) physical pains.
The articles were published between 1994 and 2020. Nineteen are based on data from the
United States. Among these, eight are byBrian Payne andRandyGainey, who carried out their
research in the US state of Virginia. Other articles are based on data from European countries
(Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain) and from New Zealand.
The data collection methods vary. The majority of articles are based on quantitative
surveys of data, and many use only a small sample. Others are based on qualitative
research methods (Berry, 2019; Eife and Kirk, 2020; Gibbs and King, 2003a; King and
Gibbs, 2003; Payne and Gainey, 1998, 2000, 2003; Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014;
Vanhaelemeesch and Vander Beken, 2014; Vos and Gilbert, 2017). Five articles use mixed
methods (Gainey and Payne, 2000; Martin et al., 2009; Payne and Gainey, 2004; Petersilia
and Deschenes, 1994; Williams et al., 2008).
Articles also vary with respect to the perspectives they analyse. Nineteen articles focus
on the perspectives of directly or potentially affected persons such as offenders with or
without experience with EM. Meanwhile, other articles focus on the perspectives of non-
offenders such as students (Gainey and Payne, 2003; Muftić et al., 2015; Payne et al.,
2009), registered voters in the US state of New York (Brown and Elrod, 1995), involved
staff and administrators (Payne and Gainey, 2000) or coresidents of offenders with EM
(Vanhaelemeesch and Vander Beken, 2014). Still other articles combine various per-
spectives to compare them, such as those of offenders and students (Payne and Gainey,
1999) or offenders, family members and friends of offenders, probation officers, security
managers and prison board members (Gibbs and King, 2003a; King and Gibbs, 2003).
Results
Assessing the punitiveness of electronic monitoring compared to imprisonment
To our knowledge, Petersilia and Deschenes (1994) were the first to consider EM in their
research about the punitiveness of various sanctions. Notably, they developed an
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instrument to measure the punitiveness of sanctions including EM. In interviews, of-
fenders were asked to compare different sanctions with 1 year in detention (1 year was
equal to 100 points). The authors did not explicitly list EM as a sanction but instead as a
condition of probation. They found that offenders rated house arrest with 24 h of EM as
the most difficult condition with which to comply.
Whereas others (Spelman, 1995; Wood and May, 2003) used the same instrument and
adapted it in line with the mathematical aptitudes of the respondents, Wood and Grasmick
(1999) developed a simpler but still similar survey instrument for quantitative research.
This survey instrument measures how many months of an alternative sanction, including
curfew with EM, respondents would endure to avoid medium-security imprisonment (for
another assessment of the punitiveness of EM by using Crewe’s notion of tightness, see
Hucklesby et al., 2020).
The results of these studies reveal a mixed picture. Some studies support the preference
for EM over incarceration (Payne et al., 2014; Wodahl et al., 2013; Spelman, 1995).
However, this preference depends on the length of the sentence because inmates’
preference for EM is limited but seems to increase with duration (Wood and Grasmick,
1999). To avoid longer sentences (8 or 12 months), only 14% declined EM, whereas to
avoid shorter sentences (4 months), 22% declined EM. The shorter the sentence, the less
respondents were willing to substitute it with an EM sentence of a longer duration than the
incarceration time. Further, the preference of EM over incarceration also depends on the
type of facility. While county jail and boot camp are perceived as more severe than EM,
medium-security prison is seen as less severe (Wood and May 2003).
The qualitative and mixed-method studies give a nuanced picture of EM’s puni-
tiveness. Home detention might be seen positively, but it has negative effects on the
family (Gibbs and King 2003a). Other studies affirm that respondents interpret incar-
ceration as more punitive than EM is (Gainey and Payne, 2000; Gibbs and King, 2003a;
Martin et al., 2009; Payne and Gainey, 1998, 2004; Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014). In
general, qualitative studies point to the fact that subtler differences exist than those
revealed by simply comparing EM to incarceration. In summary, our query into the
general sense of how punitive EM is compared to incarceration presents no unified
answer. This ambiguity suggests that we must take a closer look at different aspects of
punitiveness such as the pains of EM.
Pains of electronic monitoring
Besides looking at the punitiveness of EM in general, the articles also differentiate
punitiveness into different pains related to EM. Across all articles in our corpus, we
identified six categories of pain.
Deprivation of autonomy. Payne and Gainey (1998) show that electronically monitored
offenders also experience the pains of restricted freedom that Sykes attributes to prisoners.
The interviewed offenders experienced a restriction of freedom because they had to stay in
their homes and could not go shopping, visit a church or eat out as they wished or only in a
very limited manner (Gainey and Payne, 2000; Martin et al., 2009). Moreover, restricted
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freedom of movement is also a problem of time pressure: Offenders have a strict daily
schedule and only a few narrow time slots to perform specific tasks. Notably, the pain of
restricted freedom of movement and choice, coupled with continuous surveillance, causes
stress (Gainey and Payne 2000).
Such restriction can become particularly painful when offenders have social re-
sponsibilities. A single mother, for example, stressed how important it was for her to be
allowed to take her children to school, and this was negotiated with the Prison Board as a
permitted outing on her home detention order. She declared that if she had not received
this permission, she would have breached orders to ensure her children arrived at school
(Gibbs and King, 2003a). We heard similar accounts about the importance of syn-
chronizing EM with family duties in an evaluation we conducted (Richter et al., 2020).
Deprivation of employment-favourable conditions
Often, EM leads to difficult conditions for employment. For instance, EM generates
restrictions and related monitoring and scheduling that interfere with employment-related
requirements. Offenders rated work-related problems higher than they did restrictions
related to drug use (e.g. mandatory drug or alcohol tests), disruptiveness (e.g. interruption
of sleep by check-in calls) and privacy issues (e.g. limits to the length of phone con-
versations). Others mentioned that alterations in the work schedule or duties (e.g. having
to work outside) concerned them because their employers would have to provide ver-
ification to their probation officers. Other problems mentioned included the inability to
work overtime and issues related to work-required travel (Martin et al., 2009). Notably,
offenders in countries where the system allows for more flexibility (e.g. Belgium) did not
mention these problems. For example, offenders under EM were able to work overtime,
change their shifts or accept late starting times (Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014).
Pains affecting relationships. While EM can be a means to maintain relationships and, for
instance, to care for family members and in particular for children (Arenas, 2019), EM can
also negatively affect social relationships. Offenders report increased tension and ar-
guments with coresidents in part because offenders with EM must spend much more time
at home and are unable to get out of the way of their coresidents (Gibbs and King, 2003a;
King and Gibbs, 2003; Payne and Gainey, 1998; Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014). In ad-
dition, temporal and spatial restrictions defined by an EM-controlled schedule also require
family members or coresidents to accept and adapt to involuntary restrictions. Often,
offenders on parole are men coming from a hypermasculine prison context who need to
readapt to a female-led household, which accentuates gendered problems (Kilgore 2013:
131). Further, EM is based on tight planning and predefined schedules. However, family
life has its own dynamics and everyday life is not always foreseeable because accidents
may occur and people may fall sick. Reacting to such situations without breaching
sanctions is difficult if not impossible for people with EM (Kilgore 2013).
And yet, the contrary also happens: Some offenders report that EM helped them to
improve their relationships because it enabled them to spend more ‘quality time’ with
others and strengthen bonds or rebuild relationships after spending time in prison (Gibbs
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and King, 2003a; Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014). Along these lines, they also value that
EM allowed them to be close to their partners, children and significant others (Payne and
Gainey, 1998) by increasing interaction within the family (King and Gibbs, 2003).
Deprivation of liberty results in mental pains. Offenders report various forms of mental pain,
such as shame that arises because offenders must tell others that they cannot go out and
that they are confined to the house because of their status as offenders and the limitations
of EM. Moreover, some found wearing a visible device embarrassing because it marked
them as offenders (Gainey and Payne, 2000; Martin et al., 2009; Payne and Gainey, 1998;
Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014). In addition, the transport from jail to house arrest with EM
can result in a painful experience when officials use the occasion to demonstrate power
(Eife and Kirk, 2020).
The confrontation with freedom, restricted according to the schedule set by the en-
forcing authorities, is also painful for offenders. The freedom they gain with EM over
incarceration weighs less than the device’s constant reminder that this freedom is con-
ditional. The restricted freedom of EM exists on the threshold between freedom and
incarceration. While in prison, offenders can focus on life inside prison and are not forced
to think about liberty outside prison (Vos and Gilbert, 2017). When outside prison,
offenders compare their situation to the situation of free people they encounter and suffer
from the ‘watching others effect’ (Payne and Gainey, 1998).
Further emotional pains are mentioned by offenders from Belgian and Norway who
state that the permanent threat of being sent back to prison is a source of stress (Vos and
Gilbert, 2017). Meanwhile, younger detainees from New Zealand say that being on house
arrest and having considerable spare time makes them feel depressed, bored and trapped
in the house. On the other hand, older detainees or those with young children did not
report these emotions and were able to occupy themselves with work in the house (King
and Gibbs, 2003).
Financial pains. Financial pains can arise directly because offenders must pay for the EM
device or contribute to monitoring fees (Martin et al., 2009; Payne and Gainey, 1998).
Indirect costs can also arise: Offenders who cannot work overtime anymore may lose part
of their income (Payne and Gainey, 1998) or have to invest in additional equipment such
as a phone (Martin et al., 2009; Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014) to ensure availability.
Moreover, travelling costs can also arise such as those related to a ticket to visit their
probation officer (Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014). Such financial demands particularly
penalize people from low-income households who have limited possibilities to adapt their
work to the demands of the EM schedule. In some jurisdictions, this also results in a
pronounced penalization along racial lines (Kilgore 2013).
Physical pains. Some respondents report that the device hurts their leg while sleeping, they
sweat underneath the bracelet (Vanhaelemeesch et al., 2014) or the device is generally
uncomfortable (Payne and Gainey, 1998). The device restricts offenders in their choice of
clothing and shoes. In particular, if offenders want to cover the device, they must wear
loose clothing and cannot wear boots.
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Applying Sykes’ concept of pains of imprisonment to the application of EM shows EM
can have similar pains as incarceration, while new pains are also linked to this alternative
sanction. At the same time, the pains are not experienced evenly and we often found
contradictory reports about whether certain aspects of EM are experienced as pain or an
opportunity. We will therefore look into differences among offenders to assess the factors
that further explain EM’s punitiveness.
The influence of demographic variables
An explanation of the varying degrees of pain due to EM lies in offenders’ socio-
demographic characteristics. Regarding gender, one can speak of a gender gap
(Holdworth and Hucklesby, 2014) because EMwas designed for men but is often given to
women. Because women are often categorized as low-risk offenders and often have
family duties, they seem the ideal candidates for EM. Although EM might offer the
possibility to stay at home and take care of family and children, feasibility entirely
depends on the way the schedule is set up. EM can also be rejected because an inflexible
schedule can hinder women in meeting their care duties even while being present (Wood
and Grasmick, 1999). A gender difference in emotional pain may arise because women
might suffer more than men do from the visibility of the bracelet and feel greater shame
and embarrassment (Gainey and Payne, 2000; Payne and Gainey, 1998, 2002). At the
same time, women are not solely defined by gender, and individual factors such as
lifestyle, family status or knowledge of the criminal system can influence individual
experiences of EM (Holdsworth 2020).
Aside from gender, age also influences emotional pain. The visibility of the bracelet
bothers offenders older than 40 more than it does younger offenders (Payne and Gainey,
2002). Losing the possibility of going for a walk whenever they wish is a greater stress for
older offenders than it is for younger. Older offenders tend to have prior experiences with
the carceral system. For instance, Irizarry et al. (2016: 10) suggest that ‘older respondents
are more likely to be familiar with the criminal justice system and may thus be more
sceptical of correctional alternatives’.
Race or in other countries ethnic or national background also influences the perception
of the pain of EM (Irizarry et al., 2016; Kilgore, 2015; Wood and May, 2003). Due to
overexposure to punitive and discriminating experiences with the criminal justice system,
Black people (or migrants in other contexts) often perceive EM as more punitive than
incarceration is (Kilgore 2015). While incarceration provides a predictable frame, al-
ternative sanctions are seen as more of a gamble. Because Black offenders experience the
criminal justice system as racially biased, they rate alternative sanctions and EM as
additional sanctions rather than as options (Payne and Gainey, 2002). This race-biased
punitiveness of the US system in particular is also reinforced by the disproportionate EM-
based monitoring of Black people on parole (Kilgore 2012, 2013, 2014).
Further, one’s level of education also affects one’s perception of pain. Offenders who
failed to earn a high school diploma or complete compulsory education rated the punitive
effect of EM higher (Wodahl et al., 2013). The level of education is also linked to the type
of work one has and the individual experience with EM. For instance, office work is more
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easily adaptable to tight schedules and location fixes, but uncertain work conditions are
difficult to maintain with predefined schedules. Still other studies found no evidence that
education level would influence the odds of an offender’s preference of EM over prison
(Irizarry et al., 2016). The influence education level has on the punitiveness of EM
therefore remains uncertain.
Finally, family and marital status influence perceptions of EM pains. As Irizarry et al.
(2016:9) point out, ‘inmates with full-time responsibility for their children have nearly
twice the odds of preferring electronic monitoring than inmates without children’. Wodahl
et al. (2013), to the contrary, report that single offenders are more willing than married
offenders are to spend more days with EM to avoid additional time in jail. Although
Wodahl et al. do not explain this relation, other studies point to the possibility that married
people feel greater shame about EM in the presence of close relatives than single people
do (Gainey and Payne, 2000).
The pain of family, friends and relevant others
People cohabiting with the offender, such as family members, close friends, partners or
flatmates, stated they felt they had to sacrifice some of their routines and time to support
the offender (Gibbs and King, 2003a) and, along these lines, coresidents often adjusted
their daily life to support the monitored offender (Vanhaelemeesch and Vander Beken,
2014). For example, they adapted their work and hobbies to the schedule of the monitored
offender, making spontaneous undertakings more difficult. Often, other family members
had to run the errands and ‘pick up the slack’ (Martin et al., 2009).
Further, family, partners and other people cohabiting with the offender reported that
EM caused tension and stress in their relationships (Gibbs and King, 2003a). Coresidents
often reduced their original role (e.g. as a partner) to take on the roles of assistant, social
worker and controller (Vanhaelemeesch and Vander Beken, 2014). EM can thus have
profound and often negative consequences for relationships.
Coresidents might also perceive mental pains. Interviewed coresidents from Belgium
said they feared EM being revoked, which caused them anxiety (Vanhaelemeesch and
Vander Beken, 2014). Feelings of guilt can also add to the mental pains of coresidents
(Gibbs and King 2003a). Interviewed coresidents felt guilty when they went out without
the monitored offender whose schedule and space restrictions did not allow the same.
Offenders’ financial pains affect the people cohabiting with them, especially their
partners. Gibbs and King (2003b) note that cohabiters stated they were out of pocket
because the monitored offenders could only work part time and needed financial support.
The view from the community
Another perspective of EM includes the community, comprised persons neither wearing
EM nor affected as cohabitants. In general, EM is widely accepted as an alternative to
incarceration. In particular, the respondents supported EM for minor offenses such as
stealing or damaging property valued at less than US$1000 or driving under the influence
(Brown and Elrod, 1995). Moreover, as a measure for pretrial detainees, EM is in general
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supported, largely because supporters believe it will reduce costs associated with in-
carceration. Most respondents also stated that pretrial detainees should not be jailed prior
to conviction simply because they are unable to make bail. The data suggest that re-
spondents perceive electronic house arrest as controlling the offender in a way that
makes the general public feel less vulnerable to the potential harm they may cause by
reoffending.
It is also helpful to compare community members’ (in this case students) perceptions of
EM directly with those of offenders who experience EM (Payne and Gainey, 1999). The
students were sceptical of EM, especially regarding the dimension of punishment. The
students inconsistently viewed the specific conditions and restrictions associated with EM
as more punitive than the offenders did. One explanation is that the students rated the
conditions and restrictions of EM in light of their lives as free citizens (Payne and Gainey,
1999). In contrast, offenders compared the pains of EM to the pains of incarceration.
The public admits divergent opinions about EM. Assessments of the impact of mi-
nority member status on attitudes towards EM (Payne et al., 2009) show that white and
non-white college students have significantly different attitudes about the punitiveness
and inequality of EM. White students were more likely to agree that the sanction deters
misconduct, whereas Black students were more likely to agree that the sanction was a
severe punishment. Black students were also more likely to agree that the sanction
discriminates against the poor, turns the home into a prison and perpetuates a racist system
and that wealthy offenders are more likely to receive EM. The question remains whether
the different perceptions of Black and white students are directed specifically towards EM
or to the US penal system more generally.
Conclusions
Our aim was to assess the punitiveness of EM. While in many studies, and to some extent
in the article, EM is compared to incarceration; we cannot provide an evaluation of the
punitiveness of EM in comparison to incarceration. Rather, we found a series of factors
that convert EM into an instrument of punishment rather than an instrument that offers
opportunities to the offenders.
We followed two strategies to discern aspects of punitiveness. The first was to identify
different pains due to EM based on Sykes’ (1958) pains of imprisonment. Analysing 29
articles, we identified six pains of EM that in part match the pains Sykes identified and in
part add new pains that are characteristic of the EM setting. Deprivation of autonomy
emerged when movement was limited by tight geographical restriction and time
schedules. Meanwhile, EM mostly mitigates deprivation of goods and services, but a
deprivation of favourable employment conditions emerges. With reference to relation-
ships, the increased presence of the person with EM in the family or in the shared
apartment can cause relationship problems. Deprivation of autonomy results in mental
pains such as stigmatization, the pressure of experiencing only limited freedom and the
fear of not meeting the conditions of EM and being sent back to prison. Financial pains
emerged when EM reduced offenders’ incomes or mandated additional costs (e.g. phones
or direct EM costs). Finally, physical pain related to wearing the bracelet occurs. Although
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we could identify pains, the studies did not clearly show whether offenders in general
experienced these pains and whether they contributed to the punitive character of EM.
While our review of the different pains involved with EM provides deeper insight into
EM, it does not provide a clear answer to the question of EM’s punitiveness. Nevertheless,
we uncovered a pattern pointing towards differences not so much in the type of sanction
but instead among convicts. For instance, we found that convicts with familial duties are
often affected by the pains of EM differently than convicts without familial duties are.
Nevertheless, our findings remain ambivalent. For example, one study states that convicts
with familial duties suffer from the restricted freedom of EM, whereas in other studies
caregivers explain that they can meet their duties because of EM’s flexibility.
We therefore followed a second strategy and compared the studies along social
categories such as gender, age, race, education and familial or marital status. Regarding
gender, women and men were differently affected by the pains because of their differing
social roles and related familial responsibilities; work conditions were characterized, for
women in particular, by work on-demand and flexible work hours, as well as potentially
experiencing more shame in social relations. Age often indicated previous incarceration,
and older convicts who knew incarceration were less inclined to accept EM than younger
convicts were. The way the criminal justice system is perceived in general, and in
particular, its bias towards people of colour and people with migrant background, in-
fluences the perception of EM. Levels of education provide a link to class and therefore
help to ease some of the pains such as the financial burden or the work-related pains that
are more pronounced in flexible and precarious jobs. At the same time, educational
background did not provide a clear explanation of the perception of EM’s punitiveness
either. Finally, familial status was particularly relevant with regard to familial duties and
relationships: On the one hand, family life correlated with approval of EM because it
enables users to meet their familial duties; on the other hand, offenders felt that their
continuous presence in the home and their financial needs represented a burden for other
family members. To sum up, the punitiveness of EM is strongly linked to a person’s social,
familial and professional life and their status in society.
The individual characteristics of offenders’ lives, as well as the structural aspects of
class, race and gender bring us back to the criminal justice system. While the jurisdiction
as such did not provide a factor that explains the punitiveness of EM, nevertheless
important contextual aspects interplay with the differences and needs at the personal level.
One important element is whether EM is offered as an alternative (instead of incar-
ceration) or whether it is used as a measure on top of a sanction (Eisenberg, 2017; Kilgore
2015). The use of EM as a means of controlling people on parole turns it into an additional
punishment because it substantially restricts freedom of movement and deprives people of
the dynamics of family, work and life in general. Parole is freedom under the condition of
not reoffending and is therefore jeopardized by additional control which results in
punishment.
Another factor is the way EM is framed. The scheduling and monitoring by the parole
officers has a decisive effect on how EM is perceived. This also explains in part the
differences among the studies. While some studies explicitly state that a flexible framing
of EM made the instrument acceptable for people, others did not provide information on
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this point. Whether schedules can be altered by the people wearing EM, whether parole
officers accept important reasons such as delayed trains or the accident of a family
member as explanations for not adhering to the schedule and whether real life and its
changes are accepted as a fact instead of insisting on the predefined schedule changes how
EM is perceived.
The punitiveness of EM lies therefore not in the instrument as such. It can be used as a
technique of control and punishment or it can provide the means of an alternative sanction
to incarceration. The outcome depends on the ways of sanctioning. If EM is used instead
of incarceration, then it represents an alternative, otherwise it turns into an additional
punishment (Kilgore, 2015). If EM is meant to provide an alternative to incarceration,
then it also requires a framing that adapts to the life situations of the people wearing the
bracelet and the people in the household; that is, it requires a certain degree of flexibility
(Holdsworth, 2020).
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Note
1. The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a technology that is used for orientation and localization
purposes (e.g. in navigation systems). The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) is
the standard developed for mobile communication (e.g. mobile phones), also known as second
generation (2G).
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